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The Bretton Woods agreement in July 1944 established an international monetary framework 
that would overcome the perceived problems of the interwar period, especially the 
perceptions that floating exchange rates and capital flows (hot money movements) were a key 
source of the instability of the 1930s and that international cooperation had failed. The 
implicit goals of the system were exchange rate stability and trade liberalisation. The former 
was to be achieved by countries operating a pegged but adjustable exchange rate and the 
latter through the acceptance of current account convertibility. Once the European members 
declared current account convertibility in December 1958, however, the system quickly 
evolved into a gold dollar standard with many of the flaws of the interwar gold exchange 
standard combined with some new ones: the inability of the adjustable peg to adjust because 
of fear of the speculative attack that would ensue if even the hint of devaluation were made; 
and the inability to seal off capital flows (Bordo, 1993). These flaws opened up the prospects 
of currency crises in the face of inconsistency between domestic financial policies and/or 
changing competitiveness and the declared peg. 
 
One of the most vulnerable currencies to speculative attacks was sterling and one of the key 
dramas of the demise of Bretton Woods was the series of sterling crises between 1964 and 
1967. The 1964–67 period has long fascinated academics and with the release of new papers 
from the archives, important new questions can be raised about the management of sterling in 
this period.
1 This paper focuses on the speculative attacks of the 1964 to 1967 period and the 
behaviour of reserves. Sterling acted as the second reserve currency of the international 
monetary system after the dollar and because of this, was defended against speculative 
attacks by exchange market intervention,
2 especially forward market operations by the Bank 
of England (henceforth ‘the Bank’) and by the protection of the UK’s foreign exchange 
reserves. Reserves were the key measure of the status of the defence of sterling and 
                                             
1 The best contemporary sources include Davis (1968), Brandon (1966), Stewart (1977), and 
the account in the Sunday Times on 26 November 1967. The standard accounts of the period 
include Brittan (1971) and Cairncross and Eichengreen (2003). For a recent revival of interest 
in sterling’s travails between 1964 and 1967, see Bale (1999), Roy (2000), Schenk (2002), 
Middleton (2002), Dockrill (2002) and Newton (2009). 
2 In the UK as well as the US. See Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz (2006). 3 
understanding the management of the crises between 1964 and 1967 hinges on an analysis of 
reserves.  
 
There are two analytical approaches to explaining the behaviour of international reserve 
intertemporally. The first, which we may label the theory of international reserves, is 
essentially partial equilibrium in nature and posits that observed reserves respond to 
discrepancies between desired and actual reserves held by a country, and in this literature 
much of the focus is on the adequacy of international reserves on a global basis (Clark, 1970; 
Grubel, 1971). The second approach takes a macroeconomic perspective and draws on the 
classic monetary approach to the balance of payments (MABP), which in turn is largely a 
variant of the Humean price-specie-flow mechanism (Frenkel and Johnson, 1974). In 
summary, in this view excessive movements in the supply of money relative to the demand 
for money will produce equal and offsetting reserve movements for a small open economy 
with a fixed exchange rate and facing perfect capital mobility. In the MABP therefore reserve 
changes are essentially a residual term and this would seem to contradict the theory of 
international reserves. However, the two approaches can be reconciled once it is recognised 
that if there is a stable demand for international reserves, domestic credit cannot be 
exogenous (Edwards, 1984).  
 
On the face of it a strict application of the MABP to the UK position in the 1960s would 
seem to imply that the large reserve losses sustained in the 1960s, due to the large balance of 
payments deficit, should have led to a currency devaluation much sooner than the actuality. 
However, for a country which is not small, which faces less than perfect capital mobility, and 
whose currency was regarded as a reserve currency (i.e. was held for reasons other than the 
settlement of transactions) – which seems to be a better description of the position of the UK 
in the 1960s than the baseline MABP model – the link between changes in the money supply 
and reserves would not necessary be equal and opposite thereby postponing the inevitable 
day of reckoning. Nonetheless, of course, the underlying MABP relationship still existed for 
the UK in the 1960s, as the very large UK balance of payments deficit in the period 
demonstrate, and so understanding why the inevitable devaluation of sterling did not occur 
until the late 1960s indicates that the institutional structure within which the monetary–
reserve relationship is embedded is important in understanding the sterling crisis in the 1960s 
and that is the key focus of this paper.       
 4 
This paper is divided into five sections. Section two provides a chronology of the sterling 
crises from 1964 to 1967. Section three examines evidence from credibility tests to show that 
the sterling peg was often not credible and that the speculative attacks were justified. Section 
four presents new daily data on sterling reserves from the archives of the Bank which show 
that UK reserves were lower than official estimates at the time and in worse shape than 
policymakers admitted to the general public and their own creditors. Section five examines 
the relationship between reserves and the exchange rate (the expected rate of realignment) as 
well as the Bank’s reaction function for reserves. Consistent with first-generation speculative 
attack models (adjusted for the presence of partial capital controls) we find that reserve 
movements driven by monetary and fiscal indiscipline are a key driver of the expected rate of 
realignment. We also show that the Bank was responsive to lagged exchange rate changes – a 
leaning against the wind effect – and was also sensitive to movements of the exchange rate 
with respect to the exchange rate band. Finally, we offer some conclusions. 
 
2.  CHRONOLOGY OF STERLING CRISES 
 
At the outset of this paper we need to be clear about what constitutes a currency crisis. 
According to Bordo and Schwartz (1996, p. 438), a currency crisis is a ‘market-based attack 
on the exchange value of a currency. It involves a break with earlier market judgment about 
the exchange value of a currency. If a devaluation, which also involves a change in the peg, 
does not occur because of market pressure, it does not qualify as a currency crisis’. A similar 
definition has been employed in the study by Bordo et al. (2001, p. 55), but they also add an 
international bailout to the list of qualifying criteria.  
 
Based on this criteria, there were several sterling crises after 1945. Two of the most 
damaging to sterling’s status as a reserve currency had been the ill-fated attempt at 
convertibility in July 1947 and the devaluation of September 1949, when the pound was 
devalued from $4.03 to $2.80 (Cairncross, 1985, pp. 121–64; Cairncross and Eichengreen, 
Sterling, 2003, pp. 111–55).
3 Although the proximate cause of these and subsequent crises 
was due to a combination of substantial deficits in the government’s international 
transactions (which were responsible for the weakness in the current account balance) and the 
                                             
3 See also ‘Treasury Historical Memorandum No. 4: Convertibility crisis of 1947’, The 
National Archives, Kew, London (hereafter TNA) T267/4. 5 
scale of overseas direct and portfolio investment (which put the overall balance of payments 
into deficit), they also reflected some fundamental weaknesses with the British economy, 
such as the lack of competitiveness (Hirsch, 1965; Middleton, 2002).  
 
Contemporaries pointed out that one of the impediments to faster growth in the 1950s was the 
attempt by the Conservative government to fine-tune the economy (referred to as ‘stop-go’) 
which ‘caused (or failed to restrain) faster growth than could be sustained, which then had 
later to be restrained’ (Dow, 1998, p. 263; Dow, 1964). The pursuit of higher growth was 
undertaken with the sole objective of keeping unemployment (artificially) low using very 
crude macroeconomic tools. This created cyclical instability which generated additional costs 
and uncertainty for businesses, adversely impacting upon the marginal efficiency of capital 
and the inducement to invest. These ‘stop-go’ economic policies were also inextricably 
linked to the deep-seated balance of payments problems of the British economy, namely that 
weak export growth could not support the full employment level of imports (Middleton, 
1996, pp. 42–43). 
 
Although the UK held official reserves to counter a ‘run’ on the pound, these were 
inadequate by themselves to offset a major attack on sterling and on occasions (e.g. 1956 and 
1961) it was necessary to seek short-term central bank assistance through the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The low level of 
reserves became a further concern for policymakers for two reasons. First, sterling was a 
reserve currency and if it was forced off its parity then the US dollar would likely become 
more vulnerable to speculative attack. Secondly, foreign banks and monetary authorities 
overseas held sterling-denominated reserves, known as the ‘sterling balances’. At the end of 
1945, the UK’s gross sterling liabilities stood at £3,602 million and by the end of 1963 these 
had risen to £4,232 million. The worry for the Bank was that the value of the sterling 
balances exceeded its foreign exchange reserves and could have grave repercussions if these 
funds were repatriated to London and presented for exchange for US dollars or other 
convertible currencies (Schenk, 1994).
4 This might not have been a cause for concern if the 
balance of payments deficits had not led to a persistent fear that the pound might be devalued. 
A devalued pound would mean that the Bank would be faced with demands for compensation 
                                             
4 ‘Treasury Historical Memorandum No. 16: Sterling Balances Since the War’, TNA 
T267/29. 6 
for overseas sterling holders and it would most likely be co-opted to offering costly 
guarantees against future exchange risks.  
 
By early 1964, the generally accepted view had been that the deficit on current account 
would continue to grow, the out-flow of long-term capital would be above the 1963 figure 
and the overall balance of payments would continue to deteriorate (Blackaby, 1978, pp. 24–
25; NEDC, 1964; National Institute Economic Review, 1964, p. 9). Despite this, there was no 
widespread call for devaluation by economists and the Treasury and Bank were also opposed 
to a change in parity. They argued that devaluation would severely strain Britain’s relations 
with other countries, particularly the Sterling Area, where the main holders of sterling would 
begin to withdraw their balances from London; threaten the stability of the international 
monetary system by throwing into question the practice of reserve currencies; and finally, 
provoke retaliatory measures in Western Europe and a ‘scramble for gold’ as the future of the 
dollar would be put into question.
5  
 
Upon taking office in October 1964, the Labour government announced its intention to end 
‘stop-go’ economic management and shifted its strategy towards an emphasis on incomes 
policy and selective intervention to improve the industrial structure of the economy 
(Tomlinson, 2004). The triumvirate of the Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
the First Secretary of State quickly denounced devaluation as a solution to Britain’s economic 
difficulties. However, this economic strategy – famously described by the Prime Minister’s 
economic adviser, Thomas Balogh, as ‘the third way’ – was ill equipped to address the 
frequent short-term crises of confidence which gripped sterling in the foreign exchange 
markets.  
 
The short-run prospects for the balance of payments were grim. Ten days after taking office, 
the government publicised that the balance of payments deficit for 1964 was going to be £800 
million. This announcement was accompanied by some details about the government’s long-
term strategy for dealing with the balance of payments, but this did not go far enough to 
placate deteriorating market sentiment about sterling. Following a neutral budget in 
November, the foreign exchange markets began to lose confidence in the ability of the 
government to keep the parity at $2.80 and sterling came under heavy pressure from 11 
                                             
5 ‘Devaluation’, GB (64) 61, 15
 Oct. 1964, TNA T171/758. 7 
November. There was an inordinate delay in raising Bank Rate and by the time it was 
increased from 5 per cent to 7 per cent on 23 November, it did not stem further heavy reserve 
losses over the following two days. If the Governor of the Bank, Rowley Cromer, had not 
managed to secure $3 billion of credits from other central banks on 25 November, the Labour 
government would have been forced to devalue or float the pound (Cairncross, 1996, p. 105).  
 
Following this first sterling crisis, the pound remained weak throughout December 1964 and 
into the first few months of 1965 as doubts persisted about whether $2.80 could be defended 
unless further deflation was forthcoming. Sterling was undersold heavily during March 1965 
although the Budget on 6 April and some tough talking by the Prime Minister in New York a 
week later did modify some of the pressure for the rest of the month into May. In June, 
however, trade figures were released for May and showed a heavy deficit. This revived 
doubts about whether the UK had really addressed its basic economic problems.  
 
A second sterling crisis began in July 1965, prompted by a remark from the Chancellor on 15 
July that no new measures were needed to strengthen the British economy, despite published 
reserves and trade figures which failed to show any real recovery (Cairncross and 
Eichengreen, 2003, pp. 177–78). Sterling was sold heavily on the exchanges in the week 
ending 24 July and further measures were announced on the 27 July to reduce public 
expenditure, tighten credit and to make Exchange Control more effective. The markets were 
not convinced that the crisis was under control, however, and two news items provoked 
heavy and widespread selling and renewing rumours about a possible devaluation. First, the 
reserve statement for the end of July was published on 3 August and although it was reported 
that £50 million had been lost, it was known that the UK had received a special receipt of £41 
million from Germany, prompting suggestions that the true loss was over £100 million. 
Secondly, it was announced that President Johnson had met with the Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve and had drawn pessimistic conclusions about sterling. This prompted a further run 
on the pound between the 3 and 6 August. Following the publication of July trade figures on 
10 August – which showed record exports and a deficit of only £5 million – the market began 
to stabilise and sentiment began to improve. New international support for sterling totalling 
$925 million was arranged by several European countries, the US and Canada on 10 
September 1965. Between September 1965 and March 1966, confidence returned and the 
spot rate strengthened. 
 8 
Between March and May 1966, however, signs of weakness began to appear. First, there was 
some nervousness about the outcome of the General Election campaign, but this disappeared 
with the re-election of the Labour government. Secondly, the Budget at the beginning of May 
had introduced some new taxes but it failed to give sterling a significant boost and following 
indifferent trade figures and the outbreak of the seamen’s strike, sterling was sold and 
confidence took a dip. The third sterling crisis occurred between June and August 1966, and 
it reached its peak in July when confidence in sterling collapsed and the Government was 
forced to announce a wide-ranging package of measures. These included an increase in Bank 
Rate from 6 per cent to 7 per cent; tightening of Hire Purchase; travel restrictions; a six-
month standstill of wages and prices; and cuts in public expenditure (Cairncross and 
Eichengreen, 2003, p. 180).
  In September 1966 another package of aid for sterling was 
assembled totalling $400 million and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York increased its 
swap facility to $1.3 billion from $750 million which had been granted at the time of the first 
sterling crises in November 1964. 
 
From September 1966 to April 1967 there was again a period of recovery in sterling. Bank 
Rate was gradually reduced to 5½ per cent in early May and policymakers began to express 
hopes that the balance of payments would be in surplus by the end of 1967. It was not long 
before this second ‘false dawn’ came to an end. In May and June 1967 there was a sharp 
break in confidence as bad trade figures were published and tensions rose in the Middle East. 
Both events pushed the spot rate down and unease continued into July and August with the 
closure of the Suez Canal, rumours of Arab sales of sterling, the publication of further bad 
trade figures and rising unemployment. As sterling came under pressure, the press began to 
discuss the likelihood of devaluation, which was also stimulated because the government had 
made a formal application to enter the European Economic Community. Hire purchase 
restrictions were relaxed in August and social security payments increased in September, 
both of which were seen by the markets as a sign that the defence of sterling was not the 
government’s chief priority and instead prompted more selling of sterling. A dock strike and 
further bad trade figures kept sentiment adverse, and the raising of Bank Rate in October did 
little to restore confidence.  
 
In early November, rumours continued to circulate that the pound would be devalued and 
sterling came under heavy pressure. Despite a further raise in Bank Rate on 9 November, 
sentiment for sterling continued to ebb. Rumours that a potentially new massive support 9 
package for sterling was being assembled began to circulate during the week commencing 13 
November, and as the authorities neither confirmed or denied this, the foreign exchange 
market was further destabilised. Although the Chancellor still hoped that a bailout from the 
IMF and the US Treasury could be raised, the government agreed to devalue the pound on 
Thursday 16 November. No loan was forthcoming and following unprecedented sales of 
sterling on Friday 17 November, the Prime Minister announced that the pound would be 
devalued from $2.80 to $2.40 on Saturday 18 November 1967 (Cairncross and Eichengreen, 
2003, pp. 186–91).  
 
Aside from September 1965 to May 1966 and September 1966 to May 1967, the weakness of 
sterling between 1964 and 1967 suggests sterling was suffering from a fundamental 
disequilibrium. However, this was not how contemporaries saw it. As Hutchison has argued, 
a myth grew up after devaluation that the majority of the economics profession was in favour 
of devaluation between 1964 and 1967, when there is no evidence to show that this was 
indeed the case (Hutchison, 1977, pp. 131–136). To be sure, there were some who did argue 
that the pound should be devalued (particularly after the July 1966 crisis), but many 
‘hesitated to state publicly the case for devaluation, recognizing that, the more convincingly 
the case for devaluation was stated, the more difficult it would be for the government to bring 
it about smoothly and without speculative urges’ (Cairncross and Eichengreen, 2003, pp. 
159–160). 
  
With the number of speculative attacks and reserve losses over the period, how did the UK 
manage to hold sterling at $2.80? Quite simply, between 1964 and 1967 the UK received 
lines of credit from central banks and the IMF and enjoyed use of a swap network with the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. What is often not appreciated however, is the scale of 
the assistance given to sterling throughout the period. Much of this assistance, such as the 
overnight swap with the US and the Bank for International Settlements gold swap was secret, 
so that the scale of the figures involved would not become public knowledge and undermine 
confidence in sterling. The UK was also provided with short-term central bank assistance and 
had medium-term facilities available under IMF drawing rights. To give some idea of the 
figures involved, it should be noted that in September 1964 the UK authorities had at their 
disposal $2,000 million. At the end of September 1965, this figure had risen to $3,310 
million, rising to $4,370 million by September 1966 and falling slightly to $4,323 million in 
the weeks preceding devaluation.  10 
 
3.  TESTS OF STERLING’S CREDIBILITY 
 
The exchange rate arrangements for sterling in the 1960s – with its central parity and margins 
for flexibility above and below that parity, defined by the exchange rate bands – are 
described as a target zone in the international finance literature (MacDonald, 2007).
6 If a 
target zone is credible, in the sense that market operators believe that the central bank’s 
commitment to defending the parity is credible, because the underlying macroeconomic 
policies are consistent with the peg, then this should show up in a number of simple tests. 
Perhaps the simplest test of credibility involves plotting the forward exchange rate against the 
upper and lower bands of the target zone (Svensson, 1993). The idea here is that in a credible 
target zone the forward exchange rate will be the markets expected exchange rate and should 
be bounded by the upper and lower bands of the target zone: 
lu
t s fs ≤ ≤ ,  
where s
l is the lower band of the target zone and s
u is the upper band. If the forward rate were 
to lie outside the band this would be prima facie evidence that the target zone was non-
credible. We now consider the behaviour of the spot and forward rates for our data sample.  
 
Figure 1 shows the spot and three-month forward rate from the 2 January 1963 to 17 
November 1967. Data are daily exchange rates in London, collected from The Times. The 
horizontal, dashed line shows the central parity, while the upper and lower edges of the figure 
coincide with the Bretton Woods band. The spot rate weakened during the third week of 
August 1963, but had recovered by March 1964. Thereafter, it fell below its $2.80 parity, and 
came close to $2.78, the level below which, under the IMF rules, the Bank could not permit it 
to fall. The spot rate was then particularly weak for two periods: the first ten days after the 
Labour victory of 16 October 1964 and between the time of the budget and until the interest 
rate rise on 23 November 1964. However, aside from the first ‘false-dawn’ (November 1965 
to March 1966) and the second ‘false-dawn’ (September 1966 to July 1967), sterling 
                                             
6 Although the target zone literature was originally formulated for exchange rates in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System, Svensson (1993) has 
indicated that nearly all fixed exchange rate regimes in which there were either explicit or 
implicit bands – such as Bretton Woods and the Gold Standard – may be regarded as target 
zones. 11 
remained close to the bottom of the band.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
The three-month forward rate peaked on 28 October 1964 and then fell until the crisis of 25 
November 1964 where it spiked above $2.78 briefly as details of the $3 billion loan were 
announced. However, credibility at this maturity was very short-lived and did not return until 
just before the 1965 crisis. There had been a very significant change made to forward market 
policy at the time of the first sterling crisis in 1964. Prior to 24 November 1964, it had been 
common ground for the Treasury and the Bank to avoid continuous intervention in the 
forward market at a relatively narrow margin, largely because it reduced the insurance 
premium which had to be paid by those who sought to cover themselves (in other words, it 
made the cost of speculation cheap) (Oppenheimer, 1966). From this point, operations in the 
forward market had the objectives of protecting the spot reserves by making forward cover 
cheaply available and to retain in London the large amount of arbitrage funds which had built 
up to the end of 1964. The intervention, which began modestly at first, strengthened and 
between November 1964 and November 1967, there were only two periods when forward 
cover was reduced by the Bank: between September 1965 to February 1966 and October 
1966 to April 1967. Aside from these two periods, the forward rate was under pressure, 
particularly so during the choppy waters of July and August 1966 and in November 1967. 
The Treasury, who were not privy to the exact magnitude of the large forward positions built 
up by the Bank, estimated that the average size of the Exchange Equalisation Account’s 
oversold position was between $1.8 billion and $2 billion from November 1964 until August 
1966; in fact the true position by this later date was $3 billion and by the time of the 
devaluation it stood at $4.6 billion.
7 
 
Overall, then, the behaviour of the 90 day forward rate suggests that for much of the period 
sterling was credible, although there are important exceptions such as the period September 
1964 to the end of 1965, the summer of 1966 and the immediate run up to the 1967 
devaluation. Plotting the forward rate against the exchange rate bands, as we have considered 
in the above, is informative but it does not give an indication of the significance of the 
violations of credibility. To address this we construct the so-called 95 per cent credibility 
                                             
7 Bell to Workman, 28 Sep. 1966, TNA T318/201. 12 
confidence intervals which focus on whether the expected rate of realignment is significantly 
different from zero (which contrasts with the simplest test which focuses on the total 
expected exchange rate and are not tests of the significance of non zero values of the 
expected rate of realignment). Svensson (1993) has argued that the 95% confidence interval 
test is a much tighter test of credibility than simply plotting the forward exchange rate against 
the target zone bands and their derivation may be explained in the following way.
8 By 
decomposing the actual spot rate may be decomposed into the central parity (ct) and the 
deviation of the exchange rate from the central parity (xt) the so called 95% confidence 
interval can be expressed as
9:  
    
*5 *5 () ( ) () ( ) tt t t t t tt t t ii x x E c ii x x
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where the +5 and -5 superscripts on the x term represent the +/- 5% values around the fitted 
value of x. The 95% confidence intervals are constructed on the basis that xt is the single 
determinant of the expected change in the current deviation of exchange rates from the centre 
and this is consistent with the majority of studies which estimate (5) (Rose and Svensson, 
1995; Caramazza, 1993; Hallwood, MacDonald and Marsh, 2000). The estimated 95% 
confidence interval is presented in Figure 2 and the message from this figure is stark: absent a 
few observations in 1963, after 1964 sterling was essentially a non-credible currency. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
The figure predicts well the November 1964 crisis, with the expected rate of realignment 
dropping sharply mid-1964 and credibility recovering soon after the crises although it dipped 
again in early 1965. The stabilising effect of short-term central bank assistance in September 
1965 seems to be clear in Figure 2 with the expected rate of realignment rising to a value 
which was almost insignificantly different from zero toward the end of 1965. However, early 
in 1966 credibility took a further dip, which would seem to be an anticipation of the pressure 
sterling was under in the summer of 1966. The recovery of sterling in the winter of 1966 and 
the early spring of 1967 is confirmed in these figures by the rise in the expected rate of 
realignment towards zero. However, this was short lived with credibility starting to take a hit 
as early as late August 1967 and then recovering somewhat in late September but then from 
late October credibility fell sharply. 
                                             
8 Siklos and Tarajos (1996) raise some econometric issues connected with such tests. 





It was recognised in the mid-1960s that Britain had the lowest level of reserves of all the 
western European countries, which was made worse because she required a considerable 
margin for key currency status and to provide for the outstanding liabilities of the Sterling 
Area (Heller, 1966, pp. 305–7). As Harold James (1996, p. 186) has noted, ‘the instability 
caused by the sterling balance overhang and the danger of liquidation ... lay behind each of 
the major British crises of the second half of the 1960s’.  
 
From our earlier discussion it was suggested that the underlying story in this period is one of 
macroeconomic weakness of the UK economy coupled with an unwillingness to adjust the 
exchange rate, which led to a growing inconsistency between the peg and the economic 
fundamentals. If this is the case, it might make an analysis of foreign exchange intervention 
of limited interest other than as a measure for the pressure on the exchange rate. However, 
the prevailing view of the authorities at the time was that they could finance the external 
deficit in the short-run by use of the reserves and bolster the reserves where necessary with 
international rescues. An analysis of the extent of changes in the reserve position is thus 
highly relevant to understand how the government managed to avoid devaluation. 
 
The extent of reserve losses over this period have never before been revealed as the published 
figures by the Bank were subjected to extensive ‘window dressing’ with swaps and Treasury 
bonds sales typically not reported or seen as part of the reserves. This allowed a false picture 
of the reserves to be presented and allowed the asset side of the reserve position to be 
presented and any sterling liability to be hidden. Regarded as a standby which could be 
activated on demand, the transaction would not affect the exchange rate directly at least not 
until one or other central bank sold its holdings of the other central bank’s money.  
 
Table 1 shows an exact tabulation of gold and convertible currency reserves, levels at end-
months, between June 1964 and December 1967. 
 
Table 1 here 
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The true position of the reserves can be seen in column 4 (the extent of the Bank’s ‘window 
dressing’ can be seen in column 3), which highlights the scale of the assistance given to 
sterling over the period. Although the figure for net reserves at the end of March 1966 was 
over one billion pounds, this was due to a liquefied portion of the dollar portfolio being 
brought into the reserves at the beginning of February. Column 5 illustrates the enormous 
scale of forward sales over the period. The magnitudes of these net forward sales of sterling 
have been hinted at by Cairncross and Eichengreen (2003, pp. 185-86), but the exact figures 
were a closely guarded secret by the Bank and are revealed here for the first time.  
 
We have used the dealers’ reports from the Bank to reconstruct changes in the reserves on a 
daily basis between 1964 and 1967 (Figure 3).
10 Positive entries represent increases in 
reserves, while negative entries represent losses of reserves. Each of the currency crises 
discussed in Section 1 are marked on the figure.  
 
Figure 3 here 
 
Hamilton (2008, p. 79) has suggested that the strength of the reserves on the eve of the 1967 
devaluation meant that sterling ‘could have weathered the storm’ and that the day before 
devaluation ‘the till was still far from empty’. Although this is an intriguing suggestion, the 
evidence does not support it. Hamilton quotes from a Treasury document which estimates 
that the published figure for the reserves at the end of October would be $2,780 million. The 
addition of the dollar portfolio, central bank facilities and the IMF drawing rights brings the 
amount of assets available to $5.1 billion. However, when Britain’s short and medium-term 
liabilities are factored in, this figure falls to $2.5 billion. On the 16 November 1967, the 
Treasury assumed that a little over $1 billion of resources would still be available at the end 
of November, and coupled to the IMF drawing rights, the UK had at its disposal, a total of 
$2.2 billion with which to defend sterling.
11 Due to window dressing, published reserve 
figures are misleading, however, and Column 3 of Table 1 shows that at the end of October 
net reserves stood at $244 million, which at that point, was probably the lowest end of month 
figure ever. The dealers’ report show that by 16 November, a further $728 million had been 
spent trying to defend the parity so in reality, the situation was much worse. Without a further 
                                             
10 This follows the same approach as Klug and Smith (1999). 
11 ‘The length of our tether as at 16 November 1967’, TNA T318/183. 15 
massive rescue (which had been ruled out by the IMF and US officials over the weekend of 
10/11 November 1967), the $2.80 parity was simply untenable.  
 
The scale of the total reserve losses during the crises between 1964 and 1967 can be 
compared to earlier post-war crises. Between 1 April 1949 and the devaluation of 18 
September 1949, the reserves fell by $564 million (Cairncross and Eichengreen, 2003, p. 
147). During the sterling crises of September 1951 to January 1952, the reserves fell by 
almost $900 million (Dow, 1964, p. 73). Klug and Smith (1999, p. 193) report that in the 
1955 crisis (July to December), $248 million was lost and in the Suez Crisis (July 26 to 
December 7 1956) $655 million was lost. During the Suez Crises, $400 million was lost in 
one month alone (November 1956), which was the highest single monthly figure post-war, 
since a loss of $256 million in October 1951 (Boughton, 2001, pp. 434–35). The losses 
during the period between 1964 and 1967 were on a scale far larger than anything prior to 
this date, as can been seen from Table 2. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Table 2 shows how market intervention was the overwhelming cause of the reserve loss, 
particularly in the form of support to forward sterling. As discussed earlier, this policy was 
unprecedented. In November 1956, only $13 million were spent on supporting forward 
sterling and only $30 million were spent in the year as a whole; the totals for 1964, 1965, 
1966 and 1967 were $1.6 billion, $1.7 billion, $3.7 billion and $4.8 billion, respectively. The 
steady loss of reserves illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 3 at the time of each currency crisis 
followed by acceleration in reserve losses and intervention are typical of the other currency 
crises described by economists and economic historians (Bordo and Schwartz, 1996; 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1996; Bordo et al. 2001). 
 
 
5.  EXPECTED RATE OF REALIGNMENT, RESERVE CHANGES AND 
REACTION FUNCTIONS 
 
In this section we examine the interactions between reserve changes and two measures of 
exchange rates – the change in the spot rate, in terms of a standard reaction function, and the 
relationship between the expected rate of realignment and the change in reserves. The former 16 
relationship gives an indication of the interaction between two measures of financial crisis 
and, specifically, quantifies how reserves react to exchange rate changes. The latter 
relationship should shed light on how important reserve changes were during the period in 
driving the lack of credibility which we demonstrated in Section 3 was the norm in the 1960s. 
 
5.1   Reserve changes and the expected rate of realignment 
 
In this section we examine the extent to which the evident non-zero expected rate of 
realignment was related to reserve changes over the period. First generation speculative 
attack models emphasise the importance of poorly managed monetary and fiscal policy for 
the evolution of a currency crisis and the ultimate attack on a currency (Krugman, 1979; 
Obstfeld, 1984). Monetary/fiscal indiscipline should show up in reserves and they should be a 
key driver of the expected rate of realignment. Of course, there may be an important degree 
of endogeneity in such a relationship in the sense that if  interventions are successful in 
transitorily raising credibility there will be less reserve losses, thereby resulting in an 
inconsistent coefficient estimate on the measure of reserves.
12  In our econometric estimates 
we account for such potential endogeneity using an instrumental variables estimator in which 
the instruments are a constant and two lagged values of both the dependent and independent 
variables. Additionally, since the model of Krugman is one in which capital controls are 
absent, we do not expect the reserves/credibility relationship to conform exactly to that 
predicted in the standard first generation speculative attack model. For example, it is well 
known that the UK in the 1960s had partial capital controls in place and the existence of such 
controls allowed the UK authorities to borrow to prolong the period before sterling had to be 
devalued. In the base line speculative attack model, with no capital controls, the loss of 
reserves is a characteristic of an attack and when this occurs borrowing new reserves cannot 
prolong the life of the peg.
13 Nonetheless, and as Wyplosz (1986) demonstrates in a variant of 
the first generation model with capital controls, the relationship between reserves and 
credibility should still exist in a modified form for our period. 
 
We use three measures of reserve changes – for spot (rspot), gold (rgold) and total reserve 
changes (rtotal) and provide two sets of coefficient estimates – GMM is an OLS estimate in 
                                             
12 We are grateful to Marc Flandreu for making this point. 
13 We are grateful to the editors for this point. 17 
which the standard error has been corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using 
a standard Newey-West damp factor, and GMMIV is an Instrumental variables estimate in 
which the standard error has also been corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
using a standard Newey-West damp factor. The results are reported in Table 3 and with the 
GMM results we see that for all three measures of reserves that there is a negative 
relationship (note that to make the interpretation clear we are using the sterling-dollar rate) 
between the expected rate of realignment and reserves, although this is statistically significant 
only in the cases of gold and total reserves: in terms of gold reserves, a one percent 
worsening of UK reserves produces a 0.1 percent increase in the expected rate of realignment 
of sterling (sterling-dollar). Using the IVGMM estimator we note a much stronger 
relationship between the reserve measures and credibility, although again the coefficient on 
spot reserves is insignificant. The correction for endogeneity, therefore, produces a much 
sharper relationship between reserves and credibility, with the coefficient rising by a factor of 
10 in absolute terms.  These results seem intuitive enough and provide confirmation of the 
main message of first generation speculative attack models: namely, that poorly disciplined 
macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy, will have serious implications for 
reserves and the credibility of the peg (note since the UK had capital controls in the 1960s 
our results cannot be seen as confirmation of a specific first generation speculative attack 
model, such as Krugman). Further light may be shed on this by looking at the evolution of the 
coefficient on reserves over time – is it relatively constant or does it change as a crisis 
approaches?  
 
Table 3 here 
 
In Figure 4 we report recursive estimates of the coefficient generated from the regression of 
the expected rate of realignment on total reserves. The picture indicates that the weight 
placed on reserves declines from the early 1960s down to mid 1964 and then rises steadily 
until it peaks at the time of the devaluation in 1967. It would seem that the importance of 
reserves loomed larger and larger as devaluation approached. 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
5.2   Reaction functions  
 18 
Reserve and exchange rate movements (both spot and forward rates) are often taken as 
measures of financial crises and in this sub-section we attempt to link these two measures by 
estimating reaction functions for sterling. A standard reaction function linking reserve 
changes to the exchange rate is given as: 
_
1 0112 1 31 () t tt t t rr s s s λλ λ λ − − −− Δ= +Δ + − + Δ ,  
 
where the lagged reserve terms is included to allow for serial correlation in the change in 
reserve process, the second term on the right hand side captures the deviation of the actual 
exchange rate from some target or equilibrium level (as captured by s overbar) and the last 
term is a standard leaning against the wind term. To be consistent with the extant reaction 
function literature we define the exchange rate as the home currency price of a unit of foreign 
currency (sterling-dollar) and take as the target exchange rate the reciprocal of the dollar 
sterling lower point (2.77) which is 0.360: a depreciation of the exchange rate above this 
point should trigger a reserve change to defend the currency. 
 
The results from estimating variants of this reaction function are reported in Table 4. In the 
first regression we exclude the ‘leaning against the wind’ term and find a significantly 
negative coefficient on the deviation of the exchange rate from the edge of the band: a 1 per 
cent depreciation of the rate above the band produces a 21 per cent change in reserves. In the 
second specification we drop the deviation term and include the ‘leaning against the wind’ 
term. This also produces a significantly negative coefficient, although the magnitude is not as 
large as for the deviation term. Finally, the last equation includes both exchange rate effects 
and both appear statistically significant: the coefficient on the deviation term is similar to the 
first regression whilst the coefficient on the leaning against the wind term is about double that 
on the same term in equation 2. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Clearly then it would appear that the Bank during the 1960s was reacting to both exchange 
rate pressure within the target zone bands – intra marginal intervention - and also intervening 
at the lower band itself (marginal intervention) and that this intervention had a relatively 





This paper has contributed to the literature on sterling by drawing on new archival sources of 
information and fresh data on reserves and exchange market intervention. Our research shows 
that the sterling peg became increasingly incredible in the 1964 to 1967 period as it flirted 
with and fell below the lower credibility bands we estimated. Moreover we show that the 
pound was propped up by international rescue loans from the G11 and the IMF. The peg 
collapsed when the rescues ceased. Thus the new reserves data reveals that the UK’s 
international reserves were inadequate at the same time as the credibility of the peg was low. 
Indeed without the international rescues, sterling would have been forced to devalue earlier. 
The addition to its reserves gave the British authorities the breathing room to manage the 
inevitable exit from the sterling peg of $2.80. At the time, the monetary authorities found it 
hard to admit to themselves that sterling was doomed. 
 
The sterling crises represented key examples of a flaw of the Bretton Woods adjustment 
mechanism under which overvalued countries reluctant to deflate were forced to adjust by 
devaluation. The crises were good examples of first generation speculative attack models 
driven by a growing inconsistency between the peg and the domestic fundamentals. The 
crises also showed the operation of the famous trilemma which posits that pegged rates, open 
capital accounts and independent financial policies cannot coexist. Under Bretton Woods 
rules the trilemma was supposed to work because of capital controls. Like the crisis of the 
1940s and 1950s, the crises of the 1960s showed that capital controls were porous. 
 
Finally, although the crises of 1964 to 1967 were some of the most important milestones in 
the saga of the rise and fall of the Bretton Woods system, devaluation also represented a 
climacteric for sterling. The change in parity signalled the end of sterling as a major reserve 
currency, bringing to a close a story going back to the mid-nineteenth century. The 
devaluation also represented a breach of the first line of defence of the dollar as the linchpin 
of the gold dollar standard that Bretton Woods had evolved into by the end of the 1960s. 
Moreover, worse was to follow after the 1967 devaluation as the gold crisis in March 1968, 
the rumours about an expected devaluation of the franc and possible revaluation of the 
Deutschmark in the autumn of 1968 all impacted on sterling with the result that there were 
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of which  Reserves less assistance  Net reserves Free reserves
a EEA oversold 
forward position 
 
 gold  convertible   
currencies        
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1964              
October 2453  2290  162  2038  2038  3357  188 
November 2344  2240  104  1142  1142  2467  249 
December   2316  2136  179  1789  1789  2033  1319 
              
1965            
January 2299  2181  118  1498  1448  1714  2052 
February 2363  2148  216  1658  1607  1879  1982 
March   2330  2111  218  1389  1282  1560  2083 
April 2352  2111  241  1254  1148  1431  2122 
May 2859  2206  652  2710  2604  2892  2027 
June 2792  2226  566  2282  2257  2551  2094 
July 2652  2148  504  1977  1952  2251  2173 
August 2584  2246  339  1445  1420  1725  2584 
September   2755  2139  616  1756  1708  2019  2394 
October 2873  2139  734  1924  1876  2192  2097 
November 2988  2282  706  2089  2041  2374  1826 
December   3004  2265  739  2232  2184  2520  1778 
  
1966             
January 3018  2159  860  2481  2422  2775  1523 
February 3648  2131  1518  3349  3231  2699  1310 
March   3573  2036  1537  3273  3156  2632  1327 
April 3520  2038  1481  3231  3114  2621  1338 
May 3413  1966  1448  3133  3016  2523  1352 
June 3276  2041  1235  2780  2663  2176  1394 
July 3206  2237  969  1935  1672  1184  2260  
 Published 
Reserves 
of which  Reserves less assistance  Net reserves Free reserves
a EEA oversold 
forward position 
 
 gold  convertible   
currencies        
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
August 3153  2131  1022  1621  1338  854  3108 
September   3161  1940  1221  1630  1296  812  3175 
October 3217  1957  1260  1747  1408  930  2688 
November 3282  1988  1294  1901  1551  1072  2486 
December   3100  1940  1159  1770  1420  952  2484 
              
1967             
January 3130  1932  1198  2327  1901  1436  2643 
February 3170  1968  1201  2542  2173  1722  2408 
March   3259  1677  1582  3058  2786  2391  2066 
April 3405  1613  1792  3245  2976  2601  1949 
May 2954  1714  1240  2666  2366  2512  2134 
June 2834  1708  1126  2433  2195  2346  2481 
July 2792  1694  1098  1982  1562  1714  2584 
August 2758  1848  910  1389  960  1126  2568 
September   2733  1831  902  1042  644  820  2640 
October 2808  1781  1028  792  244  479  3245 
November  2935  1066  2181  415  – 281  – 281  4332 
December   2695  1291  1404  – 89  – 775  – 2323  4241 
 
Notes: col. 1 official reserves (gold and convertible currencies plus special drawing rights); col. 2 less short-term central bank assistance and 
comprises all operations (including repayments) with overseas central banks and the BIS (excluding BIS currency deposits), initiated by the UK 
for the purpose of increasing the UK’s reserves of gold and foreign currencies; col. 3 excluding guaranteed sterling, special BIS and market 
swaps and deposits and Israeli deposits and Swiss loan; col. 4 excludes IMF drawing but includes the dollar portfolio; col. 5 excludes the 
forward aspect of assistance operations, since these liabilities are shown as deductions from the spot reserve. 
Sources: col. 1, statistical annex to Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, various years; cols. 2–5, ‘Gold and convertible currency reserves’, Bank 
of England Archives, 4A98/1.  
Table 2.  Market intervention to support sterling, various dates, 1964–67 ($ millions) 
 
 Spot  Intervention Forward 
Intervention 
Total Reserve Loss
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
13 November – 25 November 1964  – 727.30  –  – 724.50 
      
26 November – 31 December 1964  – 324.80  – 1,652.00  – 1,629.50 
      
19 March – 2 April 1965  122.50  – 879.90  – 792.40 
      
8 July – 13 August 1965  – 518.00  – 539.00  – 957.60 
      
16 May – 10 June 1966  – 302.40  – 277.20  – 575.40 
      
4 July – 29 July 1966  – 546.00  – 1,380.40  – 1,738.80 
      
1 August – 2 September 1966  60.90  – 793.80  – 705.60 
      
16 May – 29 September 1967  23.80  – 1,654.10  – 1,968.40 
      
12 October – 17 November 1967  – 1,095.81  – 2,456.61  – 1,409.80 
      
 
Notes: col. 3 is not the total of cols. 1 and 2 because gold operations, short-term assistance, 
repayments and claims are not shown in the table.  
 
Source: Dealers reports on the foreign exchange and gold market, Bank of England Archives 
C8. 
  
Table 3.   Regressions of the expected rate of realignment on the change in reserves 
 
Constant Rspot  rgold  Rtotal 
3.58(30.73) -0.002(1.35)  GMM 
-0.194(0.67)IVGMM 
  
3.50(30.38)   -0.094(4.09) GMM 
-0.157(2.06)IVGMM 
 
3.56(41.31)     -0.013(3.12)  GMM 
-0.069(3.55)IVGMM 
Notes: T-ratios reported in parenthesis (the underlying standard errors are robust to heteroscedastcity and 
autocorrelation and a Newey-West damp factor has been used).  
 
 
Table 4.  Total Reserve Reaction Functions 
  
Constant RTt-1  0.360-St-1  ΔSt-1 
28.37(1.88) 0.334(14.49)  -21.50(1.94)  - 
-0.87(1.33) 0.310(11.32)  -  -8.68(4.86) 
33.13(2.68) 0.35(15.76) -24.82(2.31)  -16.43(10.0) 
Notes: T-ratios reported in parenthesis (the underlying standard errors are robust to heteroscedastcity and 
autocorrelation and a Newey-West damp factor has been used).   















































































































































































































































Figure 4.  Recursive estimates of the coefficient on total reserves 
 
 
 